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The relation between IMF conditionality and country ownership of assistance
programs is considered from a political economy perspective, focusing on the
question of why conditionality is needed if it is in a country's best interests to
undertake the reform program. It is argued that heterogeneity of interests must
form the basis of any discussion of conditionality and ownership. The paper
stresses a conflict between a reformist government and domestic interest groups
that oppose reform, leading to a distinction between government and country
ownership of a program. After discussing conceptual issues, I present a model of
lending and policy reform that illustrates the effects of unconditional and condi-
tional assistance first without and then with political constraints. It is shown that
conditionality can play a key role even when the IMF and authorities agree on the
goals of an assistance program. [JEL F34, F35]
T
he IMF is currently engaged in a wide-ranging and comprehensive reexami-
nation of the nature of its assistance programs. Many of the issues being
discussed fall under the general heading of "conditionality" in lending, defined as
the "explicit link between the approval or continuation of the IMF's financing and
the implementation of certain specific aspects of the government's policy
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program." (IMF, 2001)1 Conditionality is viewed as a central feature of IMF assis-
tance programs, essential to the success of these programs.
The debate on conditionality has raised both pragmatic and conceptual ques-
tions. The key pragmatic questions are: how effective has conditionality been in
helping IMF or World Bank assistance programs achieve their aims, and how can
it be made more effective? On a very basic conceptual level, there is the question
on the "proper" relation between the IMF and sovereign member countries that
wish to borrow, with the nature of IMF conditionality indicating (or perhaps even
defining) what that relation is in practice. There is the related question of the
extent to which the IMF can or should take political factors into consideration in
designing assistance programs, a question that touches on the IMF's institutional
self image as technocratic and apolitical. The conceptual debate is very much tied
to the more pragmatic issues, since questions of the proper role of IMF condition-
ality is motivated in no small part by the desire to improve its effectiveness. More
concretely, program success depends on successful implementation, which in turn
reflects the political constraints, raising the question of the extent to which
program design should take these constraints into account.
Intricately tied up with the question of reform of conditionality is that of
program "ownership" by a country that participates in an IMF or World Bank
program. Ownership of a program, like most terms that sound unambiguously
positive, means different things to different people, but may be roughly defined as
the extent to which a country is interested in pursuing reforms independently of
any incentives provided by multilateral lenders. Here too, conceptual and political
dimensions are related to one another, with country ownership seen as funda-
mental to programs with which the IMF "should" be involved. There is also the
pragmatic question of effectiveness. Ownership is widely seen not simply as
greatly increasing the chances of program success but as crucial to success since,
without ownership, programs are very likely to fail.
In short, reform of conditionality, even from a very pragmatic perspective,
requires an understanding of the "politics" of conditionality in the various senses
of that term set out two paragraphs above—the role of conditionality in the proper
relation between the IMF and borrowing member countries; the effect of domestic
political constraints on the design of conditionality; and the extent to which the
IMF can and should take these political constraints into account in program
design. Unfortunately, none of these questions has received as much discussion in
the overall debate on conditionality as they deserve. Hence, it is worthwhile to
address these questions in a more formal political economy framework.
The discussion of conditionality and ownership that has taken place is often
unclear. It is argued that both conditionality and ownership are central to assis-
tance programs, even though the latter would seem to negate the need for the
former. There has been a significant amount of intellectual effort in IMF docu-
ments to argue that the two go "hand-in-hand," much of it striking an outside
observer as displaying some extraordinary mental and verbal gymnastics.
1 See the IMF website http://www.imf.org under "conditionality" for a number of papers on aspects of
this debate.
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Moreover, the tension between conditionality and ownership is only one of the
points on which the debate on the reform of conditionality is often not clear.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on some of these issues. It is not meant
to be a comprehensive discussion of conditionality and how it may be reformed, but
to focus on the relation between conditionality and ownership. Though it may sound
as if the objectives of the paper are too narrowly defined, the question of how condi-
tionality and ownership can be made consistent gets at the heart of the debate of
what conditionality is trying to do, and why it may not be succeeding. Moreover, in
addressing this specific question, the paper will discuss a much wider set of issues.
I argue that a political economy perspective may be useful in better understanding
the issues, in helping to clear up some points on which the debate has often been
unclear and in providing a framework for discussion (and ultimately for analysis).
The framework presented is meant to be general, so that it will illustrate some crucial
points rather than serve as a vehicle for analysis of specific economic policies. As
such, the model is more pedagogic than one aimed directly at policy analysis.
I have argued in Drazen (2000) that heterogeneity of interests is key to political
economy; I will argue here that it also must form the basis of any sensible discussion
of conditionality and ownership. A political economy perspective also makes clear
the importance of distinguishing between economic and political constraints in
understanding the limitations of conditionality and in helping to understand how
these constraints may interact. It also suggests one way in which conditionality and
ownership can be reconciled (or at least disentangled) by focusing on conflict of inter-
ests not between the IMF and the borrowing member country but within a recipient
country. Such an argument has often been made verbally but never really formalized.
I. Conditionality and Its Discontents
Conditionality has been widely criticized on a number of grounds, but I concen-
trate on the specific question: to what extent are conditionality and ownership
consistent with one another? I thus focus on the intellectual discontent with what
may be taken as the "official" view on the interaction of conditionality and owner-
ship, where by "official" I mean what can be gleaned from IMF documents on this
question. This may be an official view that no IMF official holds any longer, but I
think it helps to highlight what seems to be the essential stumbling block that has
hindered much of the discussion.
The "Official" View
Conditionality is seen as central to IMF lending, meant to assure a borrowing
country that if it takes certain well-specified actions, continued financing will be
forthcoming. It is thus seen as allowing the country to "invest" in longer-term policy
adjustment by assuring them that if they do so, IMF financing will not be cut off.
2
2One could argue that conditionality is meant as a form of technical assistance: a country may agree with
the overall program objectives set out by the IMF, but be unsure how to implement the program. This is not a
really satisfactory answer, however, and is recognized as such. If this were the problem, the solution would be
one of technical assistance rather than conditionality, a point widely recognized (see, for example, IMF, 2001).
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To put this in perspective, one may argue that lenders regularly impose condi-
tions on borrowers and monitor the use of loans to make sure that the funds are not
used in a way that endangers the probability that the loan will be repaid
(commonly known as "moral hazard"). Banks attempt to mitigate or eliminate
moral hazard via collateral, contract design, control rights, and reporting require-
ments. Such safeguards may benefit borrowers by making lending more available,
so that it can be in the borrower's interest to agree to these safeguards. Thus,
"conditionality" in private lending is consistent with "ownership," that is, with the
realization by borrowers that availability of lending requires they act in such a way
that loans will be repaid. In contrast to private lending, countries borrowing from
the IMF do not possess international collateral or have access to other safeguards
available to private borrowers. Explicit IMF conditionality is thus meant to substi-
tute for the lack of safeguards in private lending and, by analogy, to benefit
borrowers by making loans more available.
3
What is taken for granted in private lending is that the interests of lender and
borrower will not coincide perfectly, their relation being a prime example of a
"principal-agent" problem, with contract design meant to better align these inter-
ests. The realization that a conflict of interests underlies the conditions set out in
a loan contract causes no problems in the case of private lending. Arguing that
IMF lending is analogous to private lending, however, raises a difficult question
on the relation of the institution to its sovereign members: to what extent is the
IMF inducing a country to take actions that the country does not necessarily see
in its own best interests? In the extreme, conditionality is viewed as the IMF
"imposing conditions" on a country in a way that infringes on its national
sovereignty. Hence, use of conditionality is not simply a question of prudent
economic behavior, but a potentially politically charged question of the proper
relation of the IMF to its members.
4 Many in the IMF find it objectionable even to
use the term "principal-agent" in analyzing lending programs, as it "builds in" the
assumption of a difference in objectives and is thus inconsistent with the notion of
ownership.
5 I return to this point shortly.
3 For example, Khan and Sharma (2001) argue that the analogy with private bank lending is useful in
understanding IMF lending. Tirole (2002) presents a similar argument reconciling conditionality and
ownership. Analogous to the commitment arguments made above, he argues that by giving up certain
control rights or otherwise constraining himself ex ante, a borrower can commit himself not to take
specific actions ex post that a lender would see as detrimental to repayment prospects. (See also Federico
(2001).) In this approach, structural conditionality can be partially justified by the argument that a cred-
ible promise of loan repayment requires sustained medium-term improvement in economic performance.
4 This essential tension in terms of what conditionality means about the "political" status of borrowers
has long been recognized. It was well stated by Diaz-Alejandro (1984) and forms the basis of recent
critiques, such as Killick (1997).
5 "...conditionality is often viewed as an attempt of international financial institutions (or aid donors)
to use financing to 'buy' policy reforms that are not desired by authorities. [This] interpretation of condi-
tionality is often reflected in the use of a principal-agent model, in which the Fund (the principal) estab-
lishes a mechanism intended to ensure that reforms will be undertaken by the authorities (the agent), in a
setting in which the objectives of the Fund and the authorities do not fully coincide and there are infor-
mational asymmetries associated with the fact that the Fund cannot directly observe some aspects of the
authorities' actions, objectives, and/or circumstances. This presentation of the Fund as "the principal" in
this framework is inconsistent with that of country ownership of the program." (IMF, 2001, paragraph 16.)
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The official view is that IMF lending to member countries is characterized not
by a conflict of interests but by a commonality of interests. IMF financing and
recipient country policies are seen by the IMF as two components of a successful
program that are connected. For example, a country with a balance of payments
problem needs to undertake some policy changes but, at the same time, needs
short-term financing to weather the payments imbalances while these changes are
being undertaken. Lending is thus seen as complementary to policy reform. This
may be summed up as:
The IMF's financing and agreed policy adjustments are intended as two sides
of an integrated response to a country's balance-of-payments problem in the
context of its overall economic situation. This can best be seen in the stereo-
typical situation in which a country faces acute external imbalances as a result
of excessive monetary financing of a fiscal deficit. In such a situation, the IMF
finances short-term external imbalances while the country pursues macroeco-
nomic policies aimed at external adjustment over an agreed time frame,
possibly accompanied by structural reforms to enhance the supply response. ...
In such a situation, the need for adjustment would be clear, with or without the
IMF; the IMF essentially provides financing that permits this adjustment to be
made in a more gradual and orderly way.
...Thus, the intended purpose of conditionality is as a mechanism to help bring
together a combination of financing and policies as a solution to economic
difficulties; it is needed to provide assurances to both authorities and the IMF
that both parts of the package are provided together. This concept of condition-
ality is fully consistent with a cooperative approach to designing and imple-
menting programs. (IMF, 2001, paragraphs 12 and 15.)
Under this view of conditionality, country ownership of a program is seen not
simply as consistent with conditionality but, in fact, crucial to the success of
conditionality. (See paragraph 36, IMF (2001).) It is argued that in the absence of
a high degree of ownership, conditionality won't work, and there is some empir-
ical evidence supporting this view.
6 The basic idea is that if a country is not seri-
ously interested in reform, it will find ways around conditionality, so that
conditionality will fail. The multiplicity of potential causes for program failure
combined with imperfect observability of a government's actions means that the
cause of any particular failure is not necessarily identifiable.
The Basic Intellectual Conundrum
What should one make of the "official" view? Though great effort has been
invested into arguing that conditionality and ownership are not only consistent, but
also necessarily complementary, one cannot escape a strong feeling of discontent.
To put it simply, why is conditionality needed if it is in a country's best interests
to undertake the program in question? This, to my opinion, is a question with
6Many references could be given. See, for example, Haque and Khan (1998). Dollar and Svensson
(2000) present convincing evidence that political conditions in the receiving countries are much more
important than conditionality in explaining the success or failure of World Bank programs.
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which IMF documents really struggle and often talk around. I will argue that it is
basically impossible to justify conditionality in the absence of a conflict of inter-
ests of some sort. Any attempt to argue that none really exists is not only uncon-
vincing but, ultimately, self defeating in that it stands in the way of reforming
conditionality. This conflict of interests may be due to differences between the
borrowing country and IMF, differences between the country and other lenders, or
(as I will stress) conflict of interests within the country.
7
The argument that conditionality only makes sense if there is a conflict of
interests does not fully answer the question of how exactly it is related to owner-
ship. Conditionality makes little or no sense if there is full ownership, but it also
makes no sense if there is no ownership. How much ownership is needed for
conditionality to be effective, and how much lack of ownership justifies condi-
tionality? How can one distinguish those cases in which the lack of ownership is
so severe, or the cause of problems so fundamental, that conditionality is a waste
of time from those in which conditionality could make a difference? I address
these questions in the formal model and present examples that provide specific
answers.
The central role of heterogeneity in understanding conditionality also suggests
that the principal-agent approach is possibly a useful tool in helping to understand
conditionality, both in specific design issues and in more general lessons.
8 The
optimal design of an IMF program towards a borrower is a principal-agent
problem in the technical sense, even if not in the political sense. If there is a
problem, it is in how the principal-agent approach should be applied. I will argue
that while the standard principal-agent model refers to a single principal and single
agent, the conflict of interests within the borrowing country are more relevant.
9
The principal-agent literature has also largely concentrated on nongovernment
principals and agents, also greatly limiting its applicability to the issues being
considered. There is beginning to be interesting work on principal-agent models
applied to public agencies,
1
0 and this may eventually provide some useful models




7One should note that IMF (2001) explicitly acknowledges the importance of heterogeneity within a
country, for example, in paragraph 38.
8For example, the behavior by an agent that can be induced by an optimal contract will depend on the
extent to which the interests of the principal and agent are aligned.
9There is now a growing body of work on multiple-principal, multiple-agent, and multiple-task
models, though the application of existing formal models to the specifics of IMF programs is not imme-
diate. It has been suggested that models of "moral hazard in teams" (Holmstrom (1982)) may be relevant.
In these models, the outcome is a function of the actions of several agents (and perhaps also a random
component), where individual actions are unobservable, so that there is a "free rider" problem. The design
of an IMF program would be finding a scheme that induces optimal actions by each agent. On the one
hand, team behavior captures the notion that many agents must "sign off on a program. On the other, the
team setup does not seem to describe very well the nature of the economic problem an IMF program is
meant to address nor the nature of policymaking.
10Prendergast (1999) and Dixit (2000a) present excellent surveys of principal-agent models as applied
to the public sector.
11Dixit (2000b) provides some suggestions on how conditionality and other aspects of IMF programs
may be better understood in terms of formal principal-agent theory.
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Attempting to Reconcile Conditionality and Ownership
A number of arguments have been made on how conditionality may play a role in
the presence of ownership. In this section, I briefly review some of these arguments
and contend that heterogeneity of interests must underlie any such assertion. Put
another way, the question is not whether there is heterogeneity of interests, but
whether it is between the IMF as lender and the country as borrower (the standard
"principal-agent" approach), between the country and other foreign lenders, or
between sharply conflicting interests within a country. I focus on the last view as
the strongest argument, whereby in the presence of domestic conflict of interests,
conditionality may play a role even when the authorities "own" a program.
A standard argument, taken as part of the "official view," is that borrowers
may benefit from the imposition of conditions that increase the probability of loan
payback if it makes lending more available. As already suggested, this view
requires that borrower's and lender's interests are not perfectly aligned in the
absence of such conditions.
Another argument is that the conflicts are "second-order." For example, it is
argued that the overall goals of the program are mutually accepted, but there may
be disagreement on the best means of or the "time-frame" for achieving these
goals. There may indeed be some cases where the conflict of interests is really how
or when to best achieve mutually agreed goals, but this assertion has the flavor of
"window-dressing." Unless one contends that agreement on improving the
economic situation in the country is an indicator of the absence of a conflict of
interest, any observer would have to agree that in the majority of cases, the use of
conditionality could not be explained if there is general agreement on a program.
A third argument concerns time inconsistency. Specifically, conditionality is
used as a commitment device to overcome a time inconsistency problem. Sachs
(1989) and Diwan and Rodrik (1992) argue that policies of recipient governments
are time inconsistent, governments accepting ex ante the need for policy change as
a condition for receiving loans but having a strong incentive to avoid the change in
policy once the loans have been received. Sachs, for example, considers the choice
between current consumption and investment. The latter has a high return, so that
a country realizes the value of taking a loan to increase investment. The govern-
ment's discount rate is even higher than the return on investment, however, so that
once the loan is received, it will be spent on current consumption. Conditionality
thus binds a country to a course of investment and consumption postponement, thus
increasing the amount of loans that foreign investors or international financial orga-
nizations are willing to make. In the time inconsistency case, commitment is meant
to address a conflict of interests between the country and foreign lenders.
Time consistency problems arise even (or especially) when there is full infor-
mation about a policymaker's preferences. Conditionality may also play an impor-
tant role when there is asymmetric information about the authorities' commitment
or ability to carry out reforms.
1
2 Investors may be unwilling to make loans to a
12The type of conditionality may also demonstrate commitment. For example, structural conditions
may more effectively demonstrate the government's commitment to sustainable macroeconomic stability.
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country if they are unsure how the loans will be used. A government that is
committed to the policy changes that the IMF or foreign investors favor may accept
conditions on itself to signal its commitment and thus separate itself from govern-
ment types that are less committed.
1
3 Here, it is the possibility of a conflict of inter-
ests between the lenders and governments not committed to reform that gives
conditionality a role in signaling that a government is interested in reforming.
The approach to reconciling conditionality and ownership that is stressed in this
paper begins with the argument that there are conflicts within a country about policy.
A reformist government may be interested in carrying out an IMF program, but it
faces internal opposition. Hence, though the authorities may "own" the program, this
is not identical with ownership by the country as a whole. More formally put, since
policymaking is the process of collective choice in the face of conflicting interests,
ownership by some important policymakers is not ownership by the "policymaking
apparatus."
1
4 Conditionality may then "strengthen the hands" of the reformers who
are committed to carrying out reform but face domestic opposition.
Conflict of interest over desired policy may reflect various causes. In the most
benign case, there simply may be ideological differences over what is the best way
to achieve a commonly agreed goal, a conflict stressed in the "official" IMF view
of conditionality. Alternatively, different groups may have different objectives and,
hence, desire different policies. This latter view is the one explored in this paper.
In the extreme, powerful interest groups may oppose reforms that reduce their
ability to engage in rent seeking. Numerous cases of these latter phenomena could
be cited, some of which are discussed in IMF, 2001.
II. A Political-Economic Model
I now present a stylized model of the decision of a government of what policy to
adopt. The model is highly stylized in order to highlight the political economy dimen-
sions of policy reform in the presence of heterogeneity of interests, both between the
IMF and the government of a country and, more importantly, between the govern-
ment and domestic groups opposed to reform. It is not meant to answer specific
policy questions but to highlight the importance of political constraints and their inter-
action with economic constraints. The model is not explicitly dynamic, even though
the process of both lending, especially conditional lending, and reform is inherently
dynamic, for the same reason. I begin with the economic model without politics.
A Benchmark Economic Model
In the benchmark model, there are no political constraints, and the authorities and
IMF have identical objectives, namely maximization of economic performance.
13There are many models of this type. See, for example, Dhonte (1997) or Marchesi and Thomas
(1999).
14As Khan and Sharma (2001, p. 15), "in pluralistic societies, does ownership refer to the views on
program design of and objectives held by key ministers and central bank officials that negotiate the
program with the IMF, or to the views of the entire domestic bureaucracy that has to approve the neces-
sary legislation, or to the beliefs of civil society at large?"
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There are two domestic dimensions to policy, represented by values of two policy
instruments, denoted e and t. The first may represent macroeconomic or exchange
rate policy, the second, structural policy. Economic performance (or "output") Y
also depends on IMF lending, whose size is denoted S (measured in the same units
as Y), so that Y = Y(e, t, S).
15 The pre-reform or "status quo"
16 values of the policy
variables are e
sQ and t
SQ, with the resulting level of output (in the absence of IMF
lending) given by Y
SQ = Y(e
sQ, t
SQ, 0). A policy reform is a program to increase
economic performance via changes in macroeconomic and structural policy.
The following assumptions are made about the effect of policy and lending
on Y. First, the output-maximizing level of X is 0, so that positive x is simply seen
as a structural distortion. Hence, dY/dt = Yt < 0 for x > 0. Second, in the absence
of structural distortions, reducing high e (an "overvalued exchange rate") will
increase output when supported by IMF lending. This captures the idea (albeit in
a static context) that from an economic perspective, IMF lending is meant to
enable a country to address a short-term balance of payments problem (to reduce
e) in such a way to increase economic performance (increase Y) rather than reduce
it. To model this, it is assumed first that for each value of 5, there is a value of e
that maximizes Y(e, 0, S). Call this maximizing value e
+(S), which is the
authorities' "reaction function" in the absence of political constraints, with
BY(e, 0, S)/de = Ye< 0 for e > e+(S), Y(e, 0, S), and Ye > 0 for e < e
+(S). (More
generally, it is assumed that for t > 0, dY/de < 0 for values of e above the output-
maximizing level.) The second derivatives of Y with respect to e and x are assumed
to be negative. We naturally assume that e
sQ > e
+(0), that is, that e
sQ is above the
output-maximizing exchange rate in the absence of lending. Assume further that
dYe/dS = YeS < 0 for sufficiently high values of e and low values of 5, both for t = 0
and for x > 0. This assumption means simply that up to a point, more lending
increases the effect that reducing e has on increasing Y. This implies that e
+(S) is
falling in S up to some level of aid, say S = S
max. The e
+(S) schedule, summarizing
economically constrained policy choices, is shown in Figure 1. Finally, it is
assumed that dY/dS = Ys > 0 (once again, both for zero and positive x), so that aid
can have a positive effect on output even with no change in e.
This model of the effect of lending on economic performance is obviously a
gross simplification of a complicated dynamic story, but I think it captures essen-
tial elements. Its simplicity allows us to focus on the role of domestic politics. To
further simplify the basic model, I assume throughout there is no question of repay-
ment of lending. This is clearly a heroic assumption, which eliminates a major set
of arguments for conditionality. However, including issues of sovereign debt repay-
ment and handling them adequately in a political model would be a paper in itself.
Hence, this assumption is made in order to concentrate on the political constraints
15An IMF program would have no structural component (that is, no reliance on T) to the extent that
the Fund targets Y, and t has little or no effect on Y. This would represent the case in which the IMF's
performance target is narrowly defined so that it is a function only of macroeconomic variables such as e,
so that the IMF's narrowly defined objectives imply no role for structural conditionality.
16The term "status quo" may be slightly misleading, since this could be the state after the economy
has suffered a large shock. The idea is that once the economy finds itself in this position, domestic inter-
ests may oppose any reform, hence the term "status quo."
































on the adoption and implementation of programs, and the implications of condi-
tionality and ownership for those questions. It is assumed that a fraction r of any
lending must be repaid, so that 1-r is the concessional part of lending. Net output
is then Y(e,t,S)-rS.
Suppose that the country, taken as a unitary actor, chooses a policy to maximize
net output Y- rS. (Implicit in this maximization are any economic constraints on the
maximization of Y.) Representing the authorities' objective as W(e,t,S), we have:
Max W(e, t, S) = Y(e, t, S)-rS. (1)
First-order conditions are:
= i* 0 (2)
e de
dt = 9t
Using our above assumptions, this yields an optimal policy (e,t) = (e
+(S),0).
If the IMF's objective is maximization of net output, it chooses S to maximize
Y-rS subject to the first-order conditions in equation (2). This yields a first-order
condition for S of:
Ys(e+(S), 0, S) - r = 0. (3)
Call the solution to equation (3) S









sQ. This is the first-best
economic reform program, which is both the authorities' and the IMF's preferred
solution (given identical objectives). There is no conflict over economic policy.




In this simple benchmark, there is no role for conditionality at all. With no
heterogeneity of interests, unconditional lending will achieve the goals of the
program. In fact, if the government had better information than the IMF about the
workings of the economy, unconditional lending would be superior to conditional
lending. Lending is simply a "technical" issue meant to improve economic perfor-
mance without economic dislocations. Conditionality as part of a lending program
requires heterogeneity of interests, either between the country and the IMF (or
other lenders) or within the country. I consider these in turn.
Different IMF and Country Objectives in the Economic Model
Suppose that the IMF's objective function that F(e, t, S) differs from the authori-
ties' objective W(e, t, S), where, in the relevant range, Fe < 0, Fs < 0, Fee < 0, and
FSS < 0. The optimal amount of unconditional lending from the IMF's point of
view is the S that maximizes F(e, t, S) subject to the constraint that the authorities
will choose policy according to equation (2). Diagrammatically, it is given by the
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point where the IMF's highest attainable indifference curve is just tangent to the
curve e
+(S), represented by point U
E in Figure 2 (drawn on the assumption that




the first condition representing tangency of the IMF's indifference curve and the
authorities' reaction function, the second, maximization by the authorities
implying e = e
+(S).
Conditional lending in this framework would mean the IMF offers not a given
amount S but differing amounts of lending in response to different policies e.
Optimal conditional lending from the IMF's point of view would be represented
by its choosing the point on the authorities' indifference curve (rather than reac-
tion function) tangent to the highest possible IMF indifference curve. To tie down
the equilibrium, one has a participation condition, namely that the country






which may be represented in Figure 2 by point C
E.
X1 Conditional lending makes
the IMF better off, but the country worse off, than unconditional lending.
1
8
Conditionality induces the country to choose a lower value of e and lets the IMF
achieve that objective with less aid. Here, once again, we see that there must be a
conflict of interests if conditionality is to play a role.
Why might the IMF's objective differ from that of the country's authorities?
One possibility is that the authorities have economic objectives in addition to
maximization of output (or whatever macroeconomic goal the IMF is concerned
with). Another possibility is that both are concerned about the same general
macroeconomic objectives, but the IMF faces financing constraints (opportunity
costs of lending to other countries or budgetary constraints), so that its true cost of
funds may exceed r. (Or, the IMF is simply concerned with repayment.)
17The authorities' indifference curves are horizontal along e
+(S), since this is a reaction function in
which e is chosen optimally for each S.
18The discussion at the beginning of Section I, whereby conditionality may mean higher welfare for
borrowers relates to the case of comparing conditional lending to no lending, the unavailability of lending
reflecting problems of moral hazard, etc. In this discussion, in addition to the absence of such considera-
tions, the lender is assumed to extract all the benefit of conditionality (equation (5b)), so that the borrower
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To make explicit the effect of the IMF's financial constraints, it may be infor-
mative to write its objective as F(e,0,S) = Y(e,0,S) + H(e) -/(S), where f(S) repre-
sents the (total) cost of funds to the IMF and H(e) represents the difference
between the IMF's and the authorities' macroeconomic policy objectives. The
IMF's financial constraint (and the conflict of interest it implies) is represented by
the assumption that fs > r, that the marginal cost of lending to the IMF is above
that perceived by the borrowing country. In this case, the slope of the IMF's indif-
ference curve is:
Fs ys fs
«. + y K
(6)
where, as assumed at the beginning of the section, both, Fs < 0 and Fe < 0. The
amount of lending in the three cases—of identical objectives, unconditional
lending with different objectives, and conditional lending with different objec-
tives—can be represented respectively by the conditions:










In equation (7b), the case of unconditional lending, where we have used the
assumption that on the e
+(S) curve, Ye = 0, there are conflicting effects. The finan-
cial constraint fs > r would imply that Ys > r, which reduces IMF lending relative
to the case of no conflict of objectives, while its desire to lower the exchange rate
relative to what the authorities choose (Fe = He < 0) would raise lending in order
to induce the authorities to choose lower e. In equation (7c), the case of condi-
tional lending, the right-hand side is unambiguously positive when fs>r
(remember that Ye > 0 for e < e
+(S)), so that with conditional lending Ys > r unam-
biguously, which implies an unambiguously lower level of lending.
Domestic Political Constraints
On the basis of actual country experiences with failure to adopt reforms, a polit-
ical process in which powerful interest groups can block reforms (termed "veto
players" in political science
19) seems especially relevant in studying possible
political constraints on IMF lending programs.
2
0 This ability may flow from a
19Tsebelis (2002) presents a comprehensive discussion of veto player models and their application.
20Vreeland (1999, 2001) has used this type of model to study the possible effects of conditionality in a
framework where policy has a single dimension (in his case, the size of the government budget deficit). Other
papers that consider conditionality from a political economy perspective include Drazen (1999), Jeanne and
Zettelmeyer (2001), Martin (2000), Mayer and Mourmouras (2002), Svensson (2000), and Willett (2000).
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number of sources, including the structure of political institutions and the political
power of these groups within this institutional structure, or from their economic
power and the ability it gives them to influence political decisions. For simplicity,
I work almost entirely with the case of a single domestic interest group that has
veto power, since the basic results can be illustrated most easily in this case.
Extension to several interest groups is straightforward (see footnote 22) and does
not change the basic results.
Suppose that the government is the agenda setter, in that it determines e and x
subject to the approval of the domestic veto player, who will veto any program
lowering its utility I(e,x,S) relative to its status quo utility I
s®. Treating the veto
player as a unitary actor whose preferences can be summarized by a utility func-
tion with standard properties is not a trivial assumption (see, for example, the
discussion in chapter 2 of Tsebelis (2002)), but is often used in the formal treat-
ment of special interest groups (for example, Grossman and Helpman (2001)). The
government's choice problem may be written as:
Max W(e, T, S) + X[l(e9 T, S) - I
SQ\ (8)
e,x
We begin by assuming that the interest group cares directly only about e and
T , getting no direct utility from IMF lending, so that its utility may be represented




sQ). The formulation in equation
(8) makes clear that the constraint on the government is a political constraint,
namely any reform must satisfy the constraint of being politically feasible in that
it gains the approval of an interest group with veto power.
If the political constraint did not bind, the government would choose its most
preferred policy (subject to the economic constraints), namely (e,x) = (e
+(S)fi), as
in equation (1). This would be the case in which the government's preferred policy
is also preferred by the interest group to the policy (e
sQ,T
sQ). In such a case, a
"reform problem" would not arise, and the role of IMF assistance would depend on
whether it and the authorities (or the country, which could be treated as a unitary
actor) agreed on the objectives or not. If they agreed on objectives, the problem
would be "technical" in the sense described above, and there would be no role for
conditionality. If the objectives of the IMF were not the same as the authorities, the
"standard" principal-agent problem would be present with a single agent.
2
1
The more relevant case therefore is when the political constraint in equation
(8) is binding. This would be the case, for example, when the interest group's
desired policies, which can be denoted (£
7,T




+(S),0) in a model with spatial preferences (that is, where an actor prefers poli-
cies that are spatially closer in Euclidean distance to his first-best policies than
policies that are farther away). Put simply, in this case the interest group wants
values of e and T that are above (perhaps significantly) what the government
wants. This implies that in the range of policies that maximize equation (8),
2
1 There is a slight "catch" in that a conditional lending program itself must be assumed not to make
the domestic political constraint binding.
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dV/de > 0 and dV/dx > 0, so that the conflict of interests is clear. (Second deriva-
tives are assumed to be negative.) The government's power is given by its role as
the agenda setter, the interest group's power by its ability to veto policies it doesn't
want, where the alternative is the status quo.












which can be solved for the equilibrium values of e and T as functions of S. The
politically constrained reaction functions are denoted e
p(S) (which, like e
+(S), is
downward sloping in e-S space), and i
p(S). When the government's objective is
to maximize economic performance net of lending, the left-hand side of equation
(9a) is simply Ye/Yx. As in the case of only economically constrained policies in
equation (1), these policies are clearly functions of the amount of lending S. In the
case of S = 0, let us denote the solution by (e°, 1°).
These conditions have a simple interpretation. Equation (9a) is simply the
condition that the indifference curve of the government over e and T is tangent to
the indifference curve of the interest group over e and T. The set of tangencies of
these indifference curves yields the "contract curve" of Pareto optimal points
from the viewpoint of the two agents. Equation (9b) determines which point on
the contract curve is the equilibrium. For the interest group's reversion (or
"threat") point being the status quo, the government's role as the chooser of
policy implies that it "captures all the rents" in a political-economic equilibrium
policy that leaves the interest group no better off than in the status quo.
2
3 Note,
however, that along the interest group's indifference curve, e can be reduced from
e
sQ only by increasing x.
The determination of equilibrium may be represented as in Figure 3, where the
upward sloping line represents the contract curve, that is the set of tangencies of
the indifference curves defined by equation (9a), SQ represents the "status quo,"
22With n interest groups, each concerned about some V, the first-order conditions in a politically






(where x is the vector of the V and the subscript j represents the partial derivative with respect to V) in
place of (9a) and VJ(e,xJ) = VJ(e
sQ,xJ
sQ) for every interest group where the veto constraint was binding.
23Condition (9a) is basically equivalent to the first-order condition derived in Mayer and Mourmouras
(2002) in the absence of IMF lending (using a Grossman-Helpman (1994) menu-auction model) when x,
interpreted as a political contribution, enters linearly and of opposite sign and there are many interest groups.
The difference is in equation (9b), where a menu-auction model with political contributions has a reserva-
tion utility constraint given by the requirement that the government's utility with positive contributions under
the policy it chooses is the same as what it would get if it ignored the contributions of the interest groups. In
terms of Figure 3, the equilibrium in the menu-auction model may represented by the point on the contract
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that is, the pre-reform policy parameters, and G the most preferred point of the
government consistent with the constraint in equation (9b) that the interest group
is no worse off than the status quo.
One economic interpretation of the solution, which draws the distinction
between macroeconomic and nonmacroeconomic policies, would run as follows.
Suppose a reform-minded government wants to improve macroeconomic perfor-
mance Y, which is influenced primarily by (exchange rate) policies e. Under the
status quo, e is at a high level inconsistent with high Y. The government thus wants
to reduce e in order to improve the macroeconomy, but an interest group that has
significant political power and can block reform prefers the distorted (that is, high)
value of e to a lower value of e. In order to gain the acceptance of reduced <?, the
government must give the interest group higher T, which could be thought of as a
structural distortion that the interest group may particularly favor. To the extent
that the government's objective Y is more sensitive to e than T (implicit in the argu-
ment at the beginning of the paragraph), and the interest group's objective is more
sensitive to T than e, the political-economic equilibrium represented by equation
(9a) will imply a decrease in e and an increase in T relative to the status quo.
Assistance Not Directly Affecting Interest Group Welfare
The nature of IMF lending in achieving its policy objectives is now the design of
policy given not only the characteristics of the function Y(e,x,S)—representing the
economic constraints—but also the nature of the political constraint. It is assumed
from here on that the objective of both the authorities and the IMF is maximiza-
tion of net output Y(e,x,S)-rS. I begin by deriving the characteristics of the
authorities' politically constrained reaction functions and then consider the impli-
cations for both unconditional and conditional lending.
When the political constraint is binding, e
p{S) will lie to the northeast of e
+(S),
the politically unconstrained reaction function, indicating roughly the extent to
which political constraints worsen the policy menu. It may also generally be
flatter, most easily seen in the special case in which % enters the authorities' and
the interest group's objectives linearly but with opposite signs (negatively for the
authorities and positively for the interest group). The slope of the e
p(S) schedule




P(S) are defined by those first-order conditions. In contrast, the
slope of e
+(S) is -Yes(e
+(S),0,S)/Yee. On the assumption that Yes is not signifi-
cantly different in the two cases, de/dS will be smaller in absolute value along
e
p(S) than along e
+(S). That is, the curve will be flatter.
2
4
24In the politically constrained case, e is higher (suggesting aid may be more effective), but there are
both structural distortions and political constraints (suggesting aid may be less effective). Hence, the differ-










The effect of increases in S on e and T may be seen most clearly diagrammat-
ically. Since unconditional aid does not affect the position of the constraint
V(e, T) = V
SQ, its effect comes entirely from its effect on the government's indif-
ference curve over e and T. Whether unconditional aid raises or lowers e (with the
opposite effect on T, since the constraint V(e, x) - V
s® is downward sloping \ne-x
space) depends on how it affects the slope of the government's indifference curve.
Differentiating the left-hand side of equation(9a) with respect to S for given values
of e and x, one derives:
Y —^- — V
dY IY




which shows how the slope of the authorities' indifference curve changes at a
given point. Analogous to the assumptions in the pure economic model, I assume
that the numerator on the right-hand side of equation (11) is negative, that is,
(YesYT)/Ye-YxS < 0, meaning that the effect of increases in S in lowering Ye is greater than any effect of higher S in lowering YT. In other words, higher lending
increases the output gain obtainable from lowering e, not only in absolute terms
(Yes < 0) as in the economic model, but also relative to its effect on the output gain
from lowering T. That is, if one interprets e as an exchange rate policy (or more
generally a macroeconomic policy) and T as a structural policy, the assumption is
that an IMF assistance program is more economically effective in correcting a
balance of payments or exchange rate problem (more exactly, in the effect of such
a change on output), than in correcting a structural problem. This seems to be
consistent with how one views the effect of assistance programs.
Under this assumption, an increase in S causes the government's indifference
curve to become flatter at each point in e-i space in Figure 4, as in the flatter WW
curve in the diagram. The new equilibrium is one with lower e and higher T, as repre-
sented by U
p—the equilibrium with unconditional lending—with a contract curve
analogous to that in Figure 3 that would go through U
p. (Under the opposite assump-
tion that (YesYT)/Ye-YTs > 0, the government's indifference curve would become steeper with an increase in S, so that higher aid would lead the government to choose
higher e and lower T.) The reaction function for the politically constrained case,
which we denote e
p(S), is also downward sloping in e- S space. Note that under the
assumption that dY/dS > 0 at (e°,T°), that is, that IMF lending can improve output
even if policy is not affected, unconditional lending unambiguously increases output
(and welfare from the point of view of the authorities and the IMF).
2
5
This result—unconditional lending lowers e in a politically constrained equi-
librium (when (YeSYT)/Ye-Yxs < 0)—may be understood as follows. To begin, suppose that YTs = 0, so that our assumption becomes Ye$ < 0.
2
6 In other words,
25Since (e°, x°) is feasible for S > 0, any other point chosen must yield higher welfare than (e°,x°),
which yields higher welfare when S is positive than when it is zero.
26The assumption that Yxs = 0 does not mean that changes in x do not affect Y, but rather that a change
in S does not change the effect of x on Y.
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higher S raises the responsiveness of Y to e, meaning that the economic benefit of
lowering e becomes greater. Since the political cost of lowering e (the need to raise
t to maintain the support of the interest group) is unchanged, the optimal decision
is to lower e in response to greater lending, which for an unchanged political
constraint means that t must be raised. The reasoning for the more general case in
which YtS = 0 is identical. Conversely, if YtS < (YeSYt)/Ye, the economic benefit of lowering e in terms of higher t has fallen rather than risen, so the optimal response
to more aid would be to lower t and hence raise e.
Unconditional lending is chosen in essentially the same way as in the purely
economic model. The IMF chooses S to maximize Y(e, t, S) - rS subject to
constraints (9a) and (9b), that is, given the government's politically constrained
reaction functions e
p(S) and t
P(S). Since lending does not change the position of
the V(e, t ) = V
SQ curve, it can only induce a movement along the curve, better
macroeconomic or exchange rate policy being "bought" at the price of worse
structural policy. The equilibrium value of e would be larger than in the economic
model for two reasons. First, the e
p(S) curve lies to the northeast of the e
+(S)
curve, implying a higher value of e for any value of S. Second, the e
p(S) curve is
flatter than the e
+(S) curve, indicating that the point chosen will be more towards
higher e and lower S. Lending meant to maximize a country's welfare will be
lower when the authorities face political constraints than when they don't.
The analysis of conditionality in the case of political constraints is also anal-
ogous to that in the purely economic model, but with the authorities' reaction func-
tion given by e
p(S) rather than e
+(S), and with the authorities' indifference curves
similarly defined as taking into account the political constraint. As was seen in the
economic model above, conditional lending makes the country worse off when the
country and the IMF have different objectives, and can make the country no better
off when they have the same objectives.
2
7 (Point C
p in Figure 4 represents this. A
diagrammatic analysis would parallel Figure 2.)
The source of the weakness of both unconditional and conditional lending
reflects two characteristics of the political model. First, and quite crucially, the
authorities' role as agenda setter gives it all the "bargaining power," allowing it to
pick the point on the interest group's indifference curve it finds optimal. Given this,
if IMF lending does not affect the interest group's indifference curve, that is, it does
not affect the political constraint directly, it can have relatively little effect. Any
equilibrium must be on the curve, with points on the reaction function giving the
optimal response to lending S. Hence the authorities can do no better than when
lending is unconditional. For conditionality to have a role when the constraint is the
political power of interest groups (whose interests differ from those of the authori-
ties), either lending must directly affect their welfare or it must strengthen the
bargaining power of the authorities in a political setup where this power is limited.
27In the case of different objectives (such as an IMF financial constraint), a strong distortion due to
the political constraint in the sense of e
p(S) being very much above e
+(S) means that the unconditional
and conditional lending solutions will generally be farther apart in the politically constrained case than in
the economically constrained case. In this very limited sense one might argue that political constraints in
themselves give a role for conditionality, but it is a weak argument given our interest in the case where
authorities and the IMF agree on objectives.
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Assistance Affecting Interest Groups Utility
If lending induces a shift in the I(e,t,S) = I
SQ curve to the southwest, it will allow
choice of an (e,t) policy closer to what is optimal according to the authorities' (and
the IMF's) preferences. Perhaps less obviously, it will also give a role to condition-
ality. The general point is presented in this section and some examples in Section IV.
Consider a reform package P'= (e',t') that the interest group prefers to the
status quo if lending S' is received, but where lending itself makes the status quo
less onerous. Specifically, suppose that the welfare of the interest group displays
the following characteristics:
I(eSQ,t
SQ,O) < I(e',t',S') < I(e
SQ,t
SQ,S'). (12)
That is, the interest group prefers reform with lending to no reform without
lending, but prefers lending with no reform to lending with reform. This may be seen
diagrammatically in Figure 5, in which we consider only one dimension e of domestic
policy and draw the interest group's indifference curves over e and S corresponding
to the three quantities in equation (12). (Analogous to Figures 1 and 2, one may think
of this as a "slice" of a three-dimensional diagram in which t is held constant.) For
any domestic policy, higher lending raises the interest group's welfare. If lending S'
is made without any policy conditionality, and the interest group can veto reform
programs, it is clear that once the loan has been received the interest group will veto
any program P' relative to the status quo if equation (12) holds, implying a point such
as U
p. That is, though interest groups would benefit from reform, loans or aid, once
given, reduce their willingness to agree to reform. On the other hand, if receipt of the




SQ,S') in the diagram) were not an option, the interest
group would support the program, implying a point such as C
p.




SQ,0), that is, that lending
directly affected the welfare of the interest group, for otherwise the inequalities in
equation (12) could not hold. Note further that the conditional lending package
does not intervene in the political process per se in the sense of placing political
conditions on receipt of loans or in interfering in the domestic political process. It
works, however, by taking account of what the political constraints are and
designing aid packages with these constraints in mind.
Limited Government Agenda-Setting Power
We have so far assumed that the political mechanism is essentially one in which
the authorities choose a policy package that interest groups can either accept or
reject. Suppose instead that the policymaking process gave significant bargaining
power to the interest group.
2
8 In this case, even if lending does not affect the
interest group's utility directly, it can significantly change the outcome in ways it
couldn't when the government was the agenda setter.
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The importance of conditionality when the authorities cannot make "take it,
or leave it" offers may be simply illustrated by reversing the roles of the players,
and assuming that the interest group is the agenda setter and thus has all the
bargaining power. (The representation of bargaining is very simple, and a more
complete model would require an explicitly intertemporal framework. However,
the basic point made here will still hold true in richer frameworks.) Consider
Figure 6, showing indifference curves in the absence of lending (where by
assumption lending only affects the authorities' indifference curves). If lending
were unconditional, the interest group would choose the point I = U
p, so that
government utility is the same as in the status quo. To support a point such as C
p,
just to the northeast of the curve V(e, T) = V
SQ (so that the interest group is
infinitesimally better off than in the status quo), the IMF could offer the
following (admittedly extreme) conditional lending package. It provides enough
lending if policy remains at SQ so that the authorities prefer SQ to any point on
the contract curve northeast of C
P; sufficient lending at C
p so that the govern-
ment prefers it to SQ; and zero lending otherwise. The government will then
reject any program other than C
p and revert to the status quo, but it will accept
C
p. In terms of the diagram, conditionality eliminates all points on the contract
curve preferred by the interest group to the status quo other than C
p. The interest
group knows that the government will reject any offer other than C
p and thus will
offer this package.
This example illustrates (albeit starkly) how conditionality can strengthen the
"bargaining power" of the government in the case where the policymaking mech-
anism itself does not give it this ability, as we assumed earlier. Though lending
doesn't affect the interest group directly, it is sufficient that the interest group
knows that, because the government derives utility from IMF lending, lending
changes its payoffs in such a way that it increases the government's effective
bargaining power. This is a "backbone strengthening" effect of conditional lending.
This effect could interact with that in the previous section. That is, when IMF
lending affects interest group utility and the government does not have all the
bargaining power, conditionality could serve both to shift the interest group's
indifference curves—and hence the set of points that are preferred to the status
quo—as well as to affect which point in the set is chosen. Interesting as this
second line of inquiry is, I do not pursue it in this paper, concentrating instead on
the first effect of conditionality outlined earlier in this section.
IV. Some Examples
I now briefly sketch some specific examples in which the welfare of an interest
group may be directly affected by lending, as well as some implications.
Country Ownership
One simple example where assistance directly affects the interest group's welfare
is where it depends on both its private interests, as represented by V(e,t), and on
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I(e,x,S) = aV(e,T) + (l-a)W(e,T,S), (13)
where W(e,x, S) = Y(e,x, S) - rS. To see the role of conditionality, consider the two




R) as defined by equation (2). In this case, the second
inequality in equation (12) becomes:
aV(e
sQ, x








Equation (14) with equality defines a critical value a
u(P
R), such that for
a < a
u(P
R), the reform will be supported by the interest group (even when lending
is unconditional), while for a > a
u(P
R), equation (14) will hold, and the group
will veto the reform when lending is unconditional. (Simple algebra shows that the
excess of the left-hand over the right-hand side of equation (14) is increasing in
a.) It may be said that when a < a
u(P
R), ownership is high enough (that is, the
domestic interest group puts a high enough weight on social welfare) that condi-
tionality is unnecessary.
To consider the role of conditionality, suppose equation (14) holds (that is,
a > a
u(P
R)), and consider the second inequality for a program P






















Note first that though V(e
R,0)< V(e
sQ,x
sQ), the second term on the left-hand side






sQ,0)), and it is this factor that allows the reform to be politically
acceptable.
Moreover, equations (14) and (15) can hold simultaneously. To see this,
observe that equation (15a) with equality also defines a critical value a
c(P
R), such
that for a < a
c(P
R), the reform will be supported by the interest group (and vice
versa for a > a
c(P
R)) if receipt of the loan S
R is made conditional implementing





s®,0), it is immediate that the value









R) > a > a
u(P
R), (16)
such that equations (14) and (15) hold simultaneously. (For any program P, one
can derive similar bounds.) For these types, the reform will be blocked if lending
is unconditional but will be supported if lending is conditional on acceptance of
reform. To complete the argument, when a > a
c(P





best package is not politically feasible even with conditional lending, equation
(15) becomes the binding constraint. The politically constrained second-best
reform is that which maximizes Y(e,t,S)-rS subject to equations (9a) and (15),
that is, where e = e
p(S) and t = t
P(S), and lending is made conditional on adopting
these policies.
This discussion illustrates a notion of ownership when there are domestic
political constraints, and how it interacts with conditionality. It shows how condi-
tionality can require a certain degree of country (and not just government) owner-
ship to be effective, but is unnecessary when there is high enough country
ownership. If the IMF and the authorities agree on the objective of maximizing net
economic performance Y, so that the authorities own the program, it is the "owner-
ship" of interest groups that is crucial. For any program P, conditionality is unnec-
essary when a < a
u(P) and ineffective when a > a
c(P). When equation (16)
holds, conditionality is central to reform, and it indicates "how much ownership"
is necessary for conditionality to support reform.
Appropriation and Selectivity
Suppose the political process is such that the interest group can appropriate some
portion of the aid or lending directly. This approach is motivated by the view that
in many cases, assistance programs fail because the lending is simply misappro-
priated, being used for purposes very different than what was intended.
In Drazen (1999), I considered a formal dynamic model of this phenomenon,
in which a government whose objective was to maximize social welfare competes
for resources with interest groups who, as in equation (13), care about a weighted
sum of social welfare and their own private gains from appropriating resources. A
"common property" model was adopted, in which the incentive of interest groups
to appropriate a country's resources depends on the level of resources there are to
be appropriated. In this setup, "cooperative" behavior of no appropriation cannot
be sustained when the amount that can be appropriated in aggregate is too high,
with appropriation leading to deterioration in the economy. When the level of
resources that can be appropriated becomes low enough, the behavior that interest
groups find optimal switches to "cooperative" nonappropriative behavior. A key
purpose of the paper was to present a case for selectivity. If interest groups find
appropriation to be a dominant strategy and program design is unable to prevent
such behavior, then lending will be wasted, and the IMF can do no better than
simply not provide loans, that is, adopt a policy of selectivity. In this setup, there
is an even stronger argument for selectivity. Since appropriation of resources is
optimal from the point of view of interest groups when the resources to be appro-
priated are high, but not when they are low, denying loans may serve to put a stop
to appropriative behavior sooner than would otherwise be the case.
To represent the arguments simply, suppose that lending can either be appro-
priated as output-reducing transfers to the interest group (denoted A) or can be
used to increase economic performance and reduce e. Hence, if an amount A is
appropriated and total lending is 5, net lending to affect economic performance is
S - A, so that net output is:
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Y=Y(e,t+A,S-A)-rS. (17)
The size of A may be constrained by political or institutional_features as summa-
rized by a maximum amount of appropriation A, so that A < A, where 0 < A < S.
To model interest group decisions over appropriation, suppose the interest
group's welfare is given by equation (13):
I(e,t,S) = aV(e,t+A) + (1-a)(Y((e,t+A,S-A))-rS). (18)
The interest group will choose A to maximize equation (18) subject to the
constraint on feasible appropriation, given a, the amount of lending 5, and the
government's policy rules e
p(S, A) and t
P(S, A). When a is close to 1 and A = 5,
any unconditional lending will be appropriated and hence is worthless to reformist
authorities that share the IMF's objective of increasing economic performance.
Since loans have a cost in that some fraction of lending must be repaid, reformist
authorities would prefer zero unconditional lending. This would coincide with the
IMF's reluctance to make unconditional loans if it is known that all lending will
be appropriated, that is, if it is known that a is in the range where the interest
group will choose A =A.
Unobserved Types, Preconditions on Lending, and Tranching of
Loans
In the case of appropriation, it may be reasonable to assume that the IMF cannot
observe the extent to which interest groups desire to appropriate lending.
2
9 In a
standard application of asymmetric information about types, one might assume that
the type of government cannot be observed. Here, I will assume that the IMF knows
that the authorities are reformist, but cannot observe how appropriative interest
groups are. (That is, the IMF does not observe the domestic political constraints
that the authorities face.) For simplicity, suppose there are two possible types of
interest group, one with low a (high weight on social welfare, or "high owner-
ship"), and the other with high a (low weight on social welfare, or "low owner-
ship"). In a standard principal-agent asymmetric information framework, the
principal designs a contract offering different packages, such that the two types
reveal his type by the choice of which package they choose. In a model of domestic
conflict, even though the authorities' own preferences are known, uncertainty about
the "type" of interest group means that the IMF does not know the constrained
preferences of the government, that is, its "constrained type." Assume that the IMF
can assign probabilities to the types, say probability n that the type is low a and
probability 1-7T that the type is high a. Let's denote by W
H(e,t, S) the constrained
29In presenting a case for selectivity in lending, Drazen and Fischer (1997) and Drazen (1999) argue
that conditional lending may be ineffective in addressing appropriation because of problems of asym-
metric information and nonobservability. For example, suppose not only that the use of loans cannot be
observed, but also that neither policy actions nor the connection between policies and outcomes is fully
observable. Coate and Morris (1997) suggest that poorly designed conditionality may make things worse
if it induces appropriation in especially inefficient ways.
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preferences of a government facing a high a interest group, and by W
L(e,t, S) the
constrained preferences of a government facing a low a interest group.
Consider two policy packages, (e',t',S') and (e",t", S"), where these pack-
ages are such that the low a type prefers (e',t', S') to (e",t", S"), and the high a
type prefers (e",x", S") to (e',t' S'). In a "separating" equilibrium, these packages
must obey two sorts of constraints. There are two participation constraints (each





SQ, 0)) and analogously for the type with high a for (e",x", S")). There
are also incentive compatibility constraints, whereby each type prefers the package
intended for it to the package intended for the other group. (Typically in this two-
type setup, only two of these four constraints will bind.) The IMF chooses the pack-
ages given these constraints to maximize its expected utility.
Conditionality would be a crucial part of this equilibrium, in that different
amounts of lending would be offered in "exchange" for different amounts of
adjustment. One may easily show that in this case, the package offered the govern-
ment facing a low a type (that is, where the domestic political system as a whole
exhibits high ownership) will have lower e and higher S. Only conditionality can
get types to reveal themselves, allowing optimal use of resources in the face of
asymmetric information.
An asymmetric information model in which policy induces self selection also
gives a simple explanation for preconditions in lending, as well as for tranching of
loans. Suppose we gave policy choice a time dimension, in that policies were
chosen not simultaneously but sequentially. To take a simple example, suppose
that we consider T (a structural policy) chosen before e is chosen and before
lending S is made. Then, if there is asymmetric information about type, an
announcement of a loan package conditional on observed policy t would serve to
direct lending to those countries where it will be most effective.
V. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has attempted to show how political economy can inform both the
conceptual thinking about conditionality and ownership, and the possibility of
modeling specific arguments. I have concentrated on a specific question, namely,
what is the role of conditionality if there is ownership, that is, if a government
believes it is in a country's best interests to undertake the program reforms. Key to
my approach is the realization that a conflict or heterogeneity of interests is central
to understanding conditionality. In contrast to approaches that stress a conflict
between the borrowing country and the lenders (whether an IFI or a private lender),
I stress a conflict of interests within a country receiving loans, in order to show the
role of conditionality even when the IMF and authorities agree on the goals of an
assistance program. Conditionality can be reconciled with ownership by drawing a
careful distinction between country and government ownership.
The basic results of the paper may be summarized as follows. When there are
no domestic political constraints on the government, there is no role for condi-
tionality if the IMF and the country agree on the objectives of an assistance
program. These objectives can be achieved with unconditional lending, which may
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be preferable if the government has better information about the economy. When
the IMF and a country have different objectives, conditional lending helps the IMF
achieve its objectives, but makes the country worse off than unconditional lending.
When a government faces domestic opposition to reform, conditionality can
play a role even when the IMF and the government agree on the objectives of an
assistance program. These conditions, however, are not sufficient for conditionality
to be optimal. When both the government has the power of an agenda setter to make
"take it, or leave it" offers to special interests that oppose reform, and IMF assistance
does not directly affect the welfare of special interests, conditional lending makes a
country no better off than unconditional lending. This holds true even when special
interests have the power to veto reform packages, so that a reform must leave them
no worse off than the status quo before reform. Assistance leads to policy change to
the extent it changes the government's relative weighting of objectives (for example,
if assistance makes it easier to reduce an overvalued exchange rate), but condition-
ality plays no role per se in helping a government achieve its objectives.
For conditionality to play a role when the IMF and a country's authorities
agree on objectives, at least one of two conditions must hold. One possibility is
that assistance directly affects the welfare of a domestic interest group that
opposes reform, so that lending essentially shifts its indifference curve. Lending
thus changes the set of policies that leaves it no worse off than the status quo.
Making lending conditional on specific policy changes may be crucial in ensuring
that interest groups do not block reform once assistance has been given.
The second possibility is that the government is not the agenda setter.
Conditionality may then strengthen the government's bargaining power with interest
groups and thus affect policy outcomes. By changing the incentives of the govern-
ment in a way that interest groups are aware of, IMF lending can affect what special
interests offer at the bargaining table even if lending doesn't affect them directly.
It was also shown how a model in which interest groups are directly affected
by lending could be used to formalize and better understand a number of issues
connected with conditionality and ownership. For example, if interest groups
weight both social welfare and their own private interests, a high enough weight
on the former (indicating country and not government ownership) will mean that
conditionality is unnecessary, while too low a weight implies that it is ineffective.
For intermediate values, conditionality can make some reforms politically accept-
able, with a formal model making it possible to derive how much country owner-
ship is required for a specific reform to be politically feasible.
The model can also illustrate the case for denying assistance ("selectivity") if
interest groups can appropriate aid for their private uses. When there is asym-
metric information about the extent to which interest groups weight social as
opposed to private welfare, the model gives a simple explanation for preconditions
in lending, as well as for tranching of loans.
To summarize, the paper demonstrates how a formal political economy
approach could both clarify thinking about conditionality and ownership, and
provide a formal apparatus for better understanding when conditionality can help
overcome political constraints. As the paper makes clear, there are a number of
interesting unexplored avenues, but that is for future work.
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